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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
COMMON-LAW MARRIAGES.
Although there have been several decisions in the last few years
in the State of New York declaring that the so-called common-
law marriage was valid in New York since the amendment to the
Domestic Relations Law in 1907, and one in particular in an ap-
pellate court', nevertheless it seems to have been seriously doubted
by members of the judiciary and the bar whether any marriage
other than one performed according to the rules prescribed by
statute was valid. The fact that there has existed a serious doubt
on the question is emphasized by the dissent of three judges out
of seven in the Court of Appeals from the conclusion reached in
a very recent case2 in that Court sustaining the views enunciated
in the lower courts. Before discussing the decision in this case
it may be well to consider in general the nature of the common-law
marriage.
According to the law of the State of New York "marriage so
far as its validity is concerned continues to be a civil contract."1
3
The discussion as to whether marriage is really a contract seems
now to be mainly academic. It is generally conceded that mar-
riage, if it is a contract, is not merely a contract. Inasmuch as in
its inception it requires voluntary mutual assent it seems con-
tractual in its nature. But it is universally accepted that it can-
not be rescinded by mutual private agreement of the parties. This
is because of the general recognition that the State is a third party
to every marriage and protects the society of the family, which is
the foundation of the larger society of the State. Furthermore
the constitutional provision concerning the impairment of the obli-
gation of contracts does not apply to marriages, and divorce stat-
utes are held constitutional. Thus the character of marriage as a
contract is subordinated to its character as a domestic relation and
to the marital status, with its rights, duties and obligations. These
considerations have an important bearing on the question of the
validity of common-law marriages.
It is the custom in all civilized countries that marriages be at-
tended with solemnity and also with festivity. The reputation of
the parties demands public notice of a marriage, and it is wise
'Matter of Hinman. 147 App. Div. 452.
'Re Ziegler, N. Y. Court of Appeals, Feb. 27, 1917.3Dom. Relations Law. Section 10.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
that some record of marriage be had. Nevertheless there seems
at all times to have been a tendency on the part of courts to regard
informal marriages unattended with any ceremony as valid. There
is absolutely no record of such marriages and frequently the parties
are not reputed to be married. Theoretically such marriages con-
sist of the mutual consent of the parties to become husband and
wife. The maxim of the Roman law was "Nuptias non concubitus,
sed consensus, facit." The present mutual consent is therefore
the ultimate fact to be proved in establishing such a marriage.
This fact being, however, not ordinarily susceptible of direct
proof, the relations of the parties to each other are held to lead
to the inference that there was at some time a mutual consent.
In this connection there is the presumption of innocence and in
favor of a valid marriage.4  Thus probably arises the popular idea
of the common-law marriage that it consists of "an apparently
decent and orderly cohabitation of two persons of opposite sex."5
It is true that in very many instances the courts seem to have lost
sight of the fact that the rule by which a marriage may be pre-
sumed from cohabitation is a canon of evidence. In these cases
the courts have regarded the rule one of good policy, i. e., where
the law finds two parties living together, unless there is something
directly contradictory, the law will deem them married because of
the policy of the law favoring marriages and the legitimacy of
children. 6
This question arises most distinctly in a case where two parties
are living together, one of whom has an absent spouse, living and
undivorced, of which the other party has knowledge. After
the death of the absent spouse, unknown to either of the parties,
they continue to cohabit without any new ceremony or contract.
In such a case it would seem that the cohabitation of the parties
would not be sufficient proof of a marriage, because having been
begun illicitly the presumption of innocence would be offset.
Nevertheless even in such cases there seems to be a tendency to
"infer the consent to have been given the first moment when you
find the parties able to contract".7 Whether they knew of the
existence of the impediment or of its removal is entirely imma-
terial.8 If the legitimacy of offspring of the second union is con-
cerned of course the courts are more eager to consider the union
'Gall vs. Gall, 114 N. Y. 109.
'Gall vs. Gall, supra.
'See Collins-vs. Voorhees, 46 N. J. Eq. 411.
'Breadalbane case, L. R. 1 H. L., Sc. 182.
'Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, Vol. 1, Sec. 970.
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valid. A similar situation arose in a recent New York case in
which the Court goes into an exhaustive review of the law, and
the validity of the second union is upheld.9 The conclusion
arrived at seems to have been strongly induced by the presump-
tion of legitimacy. The Court says in conclusion: "even though
the marriage cannot be supported hiter partes, there is still the
presumption that its progeny is legitimate and there is nothing to
countervail the presumption".'"
From the above it appears that while theoretically the informal
marriage consists of an actual present mutual consent to become
husband and wife, the concept of the layman of the "common-
law marriage" is not so far wrong, in view of the manner in
which the Courts allow such consent to be proved, aided by pre-
sumptions, in the absence of any direct evidence or even of
matrimonial repute. The presumptions are so strong and the
zeal of the law to find matrimony rather than vice so extravagant,
that the consent becomes an imaginary basis for a theory alleged
to be derived from good policy. The question of the advisability
of legalizing such marriages must be considered with this in view.
The principles which are advanced in favor of the recognition of
informal marriages are substantially to the effect that the right
to marry derived from nature should not be unnecessarily circum-
scribed by rules or prescribed forms. Custom, however, is
undoubtedly against the recognition of informal marriages, and the
statement of Reeve in his work on Domestic Relations that "there
is nothing in the nature of a marriage contract that is more
sacred than that of other contracts"11 is most astounding. Aside
from any religious considerations the civil law in very many
respects undeniably shows that it regards the marriage contract
of infinitely greater dignity than the ordinary contract. It is not
contended that the law should insist on some religious observance,
but universal testimony as to the fitness of a marriage ceremony
gives evidence of the custom. As is shown by the statutes pre-
scribing forms for marriage in England and the various states
the law deems it essential to good order that proper records of
marriages be had. There is further the very great danger that
in very many cases the law has elevated the illicit relations of a
man and woman to the higher and dignified status of marriage,
impressing on such relations a character never contemplated by
'Re Biersack. 159 N. Y. Supp. 519.
"Re Biersack, supra.
"Reeve Dom. Rel., 4th Ed. 251.
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the parties. Such recognition by the law of an informal marriage
by mere consent, considering the manner in which the consent
may be proved, can easily become the instrument of fraud and
blackmail. It may be safely said that an honest marriage without
any ceremony and without any witnesses is exceedingly rare. It
seems that in this respect the law has placed the marriage con-
tract in the manner of proof even on a plane beneath the ordinary
contract, for unaided by the presumptions of innocence and
legitimacy, there is not, in very many cases, sufficient to infer even
an apparent mutual consent.
In this country it seems to have been generally conceded, what-
ever may have been the law of England at various times that
informal marriages are valid by common law.12 Thus the ques-
tion of the advisability of legalizing such marriage has come up
for consideration generally for legislatures and not for courts,
because it has been held in the United States Supreme Court that
in order to invalidate the common-law marriage it must l e expressly
declared void by statute.' 3 In that case the effect of a statute
directing that marriages "must" be solemnized according to certain
prescribed forms was held to be only directory and not prohibitive,
and that in the absence of a provision expressly declaring common-
law marriages void, they were valid.
In New York up to January, 1902, a statute substantially
similar to that discussed in the Meister case was in effect. Follow-
ing that decision common-law marriages were up to that time valid
in New York. In January, 1902, there went into effect an amend-
ment of the former statute providing that thereafter no marriage
contracted otherwise than as provided in the Statute should be
valid.for any purpose whatsoever. 14 The provisions prescribing
that marriages be solemnized in certain ways were re-enacted.
Common-law marriages were thereafter admittedly invalid. In
1907, however, the Domestic Relations Law was again amended
and the section above mentioned providing that marriages con-
tracted otherwise than as prescribed by statute would be invalid
was repealed. 1" From that time up to a few days ago there has
been great doubt as to the condition of the law in New York. The
statute remained substantially as it was before 1902 and yet very
niany were not willing to concede that common-law marriages had
again been rendered valid.
12Hallett v. Collins, 10 How. (U. S.) 181.
"Meister vs. Moore, 96 U. S. 76.
"L. 1901, Chap. 339, Sec. 6.
'Laws 1907, Chap. 742.
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In the Ziegler case'6 the whole question is one of statutory
construction and it seems to have been properly decided that the
section expressly prohibiting common-law marriages having been
repealed it must have been the intent of the Legislature to again
permit informal marriages. It is conceded in the opinion that
the law was not "in all respects scientifically and plainly
expressed" 16 and that its meaning admits of argument. Many
would have been better satisfied if the Court had gone more fully
into the point raised with reference to the effect of the provision
concerning written contracts of marriage. By this provision
a mere private transaction is deemed a solemnization if the
contract is duly acknowledged as required, and it is provided
that the contract "in order to be valid" must be acknowledged
before a judge of a court of record. It has been argued that the
Legislature intended such mode of marriage as a substitute for
the common-law marriage. It is unfortunate that there was no
dissenting opinion, for if there had been, it is possible that there
might have been a digression from the main point of statutory
construction which would have been instructive to legislators and
interesting to all.
FREDERICK L. KANE.
FORDHAM LAW ScHoOL.
"Re Ziegler, supra.
